Great Naval Commanders And Notable Engagements

[kalvasflam]

There is plenty of discussions here on airplanes. But, naval traditions goes far beyond just a century.

I was curious what the board thought about who were the most notable naval commanders in history, and the best naval battles they fought.

A few obvious ones:

???: Lepanto

Nelson: Akibour bay and Trafalgar

Spruance/Flectcher vs Nagumo: Midway

Nagumo: Pearl Harbor

Tanaka: Guadalcanal

Mitscher: Marianas

Togo: Tushima

Then there were the strategic masterminds, like Nimitiz, Donitz, Yamamoto, and so forth.

I know I haven't even scratched the barest surface of the topic, but thought it was an interest subject to talk about. What are your thoughts?

[Rocket Punch]

Blackbeard

Yo ho ho and a bottle of rum.

Edited April 17, 2006 by Rocket Punch

[JELEINEN]

Farragut - Mobile Bay

Themistocles - Salamis

John Paul Jones - Bonhomme Richard vs. Serapis (don't kjnow if the battle has any name)

Edited April 17, 2006 by JELEINEN

[Wes]

John Paul Jones - Bonhomme Richard vs. Serapis (don't kjnow if the battle has any name)

391847[/snapback]

I think it's called the Battle of Flamborough Head, and I would second it. Someone wrote a really good biography of him, I read some of it for a speech I gave for him, it was really hilarious at times.

[Roy Focker]

Legend has it that after Black Beard was beheaded his body swam three times around his ship.

Which must have made him an inmortal!!!!!!

There can be only one!!!!

[Akilae]

Currently reading up on the Battle of Juland, Jellicoe vs. Scheer and von Hipper, one of the most influential naval engagements of the Great War, although for some reason the book I read made everybody in the battle look like bumbling fools...

[Phyrox]

Currently reading up on the Battle of Juland, Jellicoe vs. Scheer and von Hipper, one of the most influential naval engagements of the Great War, although for some reason the book I read made everybody in the battle look like bumbling fools...

391889[/snapback]

I think you are misusing the word "influential."

Jutland was certainly a big deal, and is interesting for tactical, technical, and strategic reasons. But it wasn't influential. U-9's sinking of the Cressy, Aboukir and Hogue was influential. It really changed how submarines were thought about both tactically and strategically by the military minds of both sides (to varying degrees of reasonableness).

[Akilae]

I think you are misusing the word "influential."

Jutland was certainly a big deal, and is interesting for tactical, technical, and strategic reasons.  But it wasn't influential.  U-9's sinking of the Cressy, Aboukir and Hogue was influential.  It really changed how submarines were thought about both tactically and strategically by the military minds of both sides (to varying degrees of reasonableness).

391896[/snapback]

However, wasn't Jutland was one of the main reasons why Germany decided to go with submarine warfare, after seeing how Jutland was fought basically fought to a stalemate? Consider: if Scheer had been successful in overwhelming the Grand Fleet, then U-9's sinkings would have merely been an interesting sidenote on the utility of U-boats, and everybody would still be convinced that old battlewagons were the way to go. (Then again, everybody still thought they were the way to go, witness the Yamato, Bismark, Iowa...)

[reddsun1]

Nagumo: Pearl Harbor

Hmm, well...while tactically the attack on Pearl was considered a rousing success, strategically Nagumo/Japan made a critical error. That being: he didn't send a third attack wave to concentrate on the oil storage or ship repair facilities at Pearl. Although some pilots enthusiastically requested to make another attack on these base installations, Nagumo decided instead to withdraw his forces to safer waters. Had he sent an attack to focus on these vital areas, the US could have conceivably been kept out of the fight in the Pacific for many more months than it already was, deprived of vital fuel to operational ships, and repair facilities to those damaged.

Historically regarded as a cautious commander, Nagumo didn't want to linger near Hawaii for too long and risk exposing his fleet to a possible counter attack by US carriers, which were up to that point unaccounted for. Little did he know that one was back in CA for repairs, the second out to sea on patrol, and the third en route to Midway [or was it Wake?] ferrying Marine fighter planes to the air base there--ironically enough, reinforcements in anticipation of a Japanese attack. The absence what were originally the prime targets at P. Harbor directly influenced his decision. Hindsight as they say, is 20/20.

Edited April 18, 2006 by reddsun1

[memnon]

I reccomend Afternoon of the Rising Sun: the battle of Leyte Gulf

Plenty of action during that battle. The last "crossing the T" in naval history, probably forever. The Yamato goes after a carrier fleet. American landings in the Phillipine Islands are seriously threatened. The IJN nearly pulled off a victory.

[Wes]

Legend has it that after Black Beard was beheaded his body swam three times around his ship.

Which must have made him an inmortal!!!!!!

There can be only one!!!! 

391883[/snapback]

YOU FOOL! An immortal dies when he looses his head! That means...he's a reverse-immortal!

[Lynx7725]

Nagumo: Pearl Harbor

Hmm, well...while tactically the attack on Pearl was considered a rousing success, strategically Nagumo/Japan made a critical error.  That being: he didn't send a third attack wave to concentrate on the oil storage or ship repair facilities at Pearl.  Although some pilots enthusiastically requested to make another attack on these base installations, Nagumo decided instead to withdraw his forces to safer waters.  Had he sent an attack to focus on these vital areas, the US could have conceivably been kept out of the fight in the Pacific for many more months than it already was, deprived of vital fuel to operational ships, and repair facilities to those damaged.

391914[/snapback]

Some thoughts:

The attack on Pearl Harbour was in a sense a strategic necessity; had the US Pacific Fleet not been neutralized one way or another, the Japanese expansion would not have been possible; US naval superiority would have rendered any amphibious operations in the Southern Pacific a moot point.

At that point in time, naval aviation was really only out of its infancy then and there's really no proof that they could have a decisive impact in naval warfare -- all they had was a demonstration on obsolete German warships. Impressive, but hardly combat conditions.

On both sides of the pond, traditional big-gun thinking still ruled; the USN and the IJN both prepared for a Big Battle of surface units -- the USN were concerned with daylight gunnery, believing that that was the most likely condition in which the Big Battle would be fought, whereas IJN prepared for night attacks involving torpedo runs. As can be seen in the Gundacanal series of naval spats, IJN tends to have a huge advantage at night battles and torpedo attacks in the early years while they still held on to the experience they had.

Had the US Pacific Fleet not been neutralized, Japan would never had been able to spread out so fast and so far. In that sense, Pearl Harbour was a strategic success, though as pointed out the failure to attack the fuel storage and repair facilities was a major failure on the part of Nagumo.

But in a sense the decision is understandable. The fleet carriers committed to the operation constitute the majority of the Japanese naval aviation assets. Losing even one of them would have been a major blow to the military power, especially if they lost one carrier to a US carrier. As I understand it, the Japanese wanted to target the US carriers... but it just turned out that they weren't in port.

I think it's best to keep in mind the probable objectives for Nagumo: first, the destruction of the US surface units, including the carriers if possible. This is the primary objective. Second, the destruction of support facility. This is a secondary objective. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, to preserve as much as possible the naval assets assigned to accomplish the above two objectives.

In this light, Nagumo achieved his primary objectives very successfully, but his overriding concern on the last point required him to abandon the secondary objective. From a military perspective, I find that this is an acceptable outcome for the Pearl Harbour operations (alone).

Moving on, had the US surface fleet not been neutralized, naval aviation might have continued to play second fiddle to the big guns. As it is, Yamamoto gambled on naval aviation and its power was proven without a doubt by Pearl Harbour.

While the strike on Pearl Harbour might have had strategic errors, the IJN had a good opportunity to make good during Midway. Had the IJN sunk the US carriers there, the Gundacanal and subsequent campaigns might have gone very differently.

[Phyrox]

I think you are misusing the word "influential."

Jutland was certainly a big deal, and is interesting for tactical, technical, and strategic reasons.  But it wasn't influential.  U-9's sinking of the Cressy, Aboukir and Hogue was influential.  It really changed how submarines were thought about both tactically and strategically by the military minds of both sides (to varying degrees of reasonableness).

391896[/snapback]

However, wasn't Jutland was one of the main reasons why Germany decided to go with submarine warfare, after seeing how Jutland was fought basically fought to a stalemate? Consider: if Scheer had been successful in overwhelming the Grand Fleet, then U-9's sinkings would have merely been an interesting sidenote on the utility of U-boats, and everybody would still be convinced that old battlewagons were the way to go. (Then again, everybody still thought they were the way to go, witness the Yamato, Bismark, Iowa...)

391901[/snapback]

No, it wasn't really. Jutland occured nearly two years after U-9 shocked naval authorities with the submarine's ability to attack major surface warships. The Grand Fleet's actions at Jutland were heavily influenced by their fear of German submarines, and rightly so, as the German's indeed planned to use some of their submarine force in the engagement.

The German's had decided to use submarines to interdict British shipping, and to give them an edge in naval encounters long before the results at Jutland largely forced the High Seas Fleet into inaction.

I don't think U-9's action was decisive though. Many people already saw the promise of submarine warfare, but it did have a good deal of influence on contemporary naval leaders. Jutland on the other hand, for all that it was, wasn't really influential in any way. At least not that I have ever read, heard, or thought.

[Noyhauser]

I think you are misusing the word "influential."

Jutland was certainly a big deal, and is interesting for tactical, technical, and strategic reasons.  But it wasn't influential.  U-9's sinking of the Cressy, Aboukir and Hogue was influential.  It really changed how submarines were thought about both tactically and strategically by the military minds of both sides (to varying degrees of reasonableness).

391896[/snapback]

However, wasn't Jutland was one of the main reasons why Germany decided to go with submarine warfare, after seeing how Jutland was fought basically fought to a stalemate? Consider: if Scheer had been successful in overwhelming the Grand Fleet, then U-9's sinkings would have merely been an interesting sidenote on the utility of U-boats, and everybody would still be convinced that old battlewagons were the way to go. (Then again, everybody still thought they were the way to go, witness the Yamato, Bismark, Iowa...)

391901[/snapback]

No, it wasn't really. Jutland occured nearly two years after U-9 shocked naval authorities with the submarine's ability to attack major surface warships. The Grand Fleet's actions at Jutland were heavily influenced by their fear of German submarines, and rightly so, as the German's indeed planned to use some of their submarine force in the engagement.

The German's had decided to use submarines to interdict British shipping, and to give them an edge in naval encounters long before the results at Jutland largely forced the High Seas Fleet into inaction.

I don't think U-9's action was decisive though. Many people already saw the promise of submarine warfare, but it did have a good deal of influence on contemporary naval leaders. Jutland on the other hand, for all that it was, wasn't really influential in any way. At least not that I have ever read, heard, or thought.

391948[/snapback]

I think it was a turning point, and many others . It conclusively ended Germany's attempt to break the continental blockade that was slowly eating away at its economy. After Jutland the Grand fleet never sortied again, and production of Battleships ended with the last Seydlitz class, as it was believed hat there were greater priorities. Moreover, it ended the threat of German Raids on the east coast of England, that did far more damage than any zepplin/bomber raid ever accomplished. Although a few more raids were carried out several weeks after, Jutland really ended the end of German traditional naval warfare. It forced Germany to resort to unconventional warfare (Uboats) and a military success on the continent. It many ways Jutland ensured the ultimate victory of the Allies, even if it wasn't a conclusive battle operationally.

[Southpaw Samurai]

Nagumo: Pearl Harbor

Hmm, well...while tactically the attack on Pearl was considered a rousing success, strategically Nagumo/Japan made a critical error.  That being: he didn't send a third attack wave to concentrate on the oil storage or ship repair facilities at Pearl.  Although some pilots enthusiastically requested to make another attack on these base installations, Nagumo decided instead to withdraw his forces to safer waters.  Had he sent an attack to focus on these vital areas, the US could have conceivably been kept out of the fight in the Pacific for many more months than it already was, deprived of vital fuel to operational ships, and repair facilities to those damaged.

391914[/snapback]

Had the US Pacific Fleet not been neutralized, Japan would never had been able to spread out so fast and so far. In that sense, Pearl Harbour was a strategic success, though as pointed out the failure to attack the fuel storage and repair facilities was a major failure on the part of Nagumo.

But in a sense the decision is understandable. The fleet carriers committed to the operation constitute the majority of the Japanese naval aviation assets. Losing even one of them would have been a major blow to the military power, especially if they lost one carrier to a US carrier. As I understand it, the Japanese wanted to target the US carriers... but it just turned out that they weren't in port.

.....In this light, Nagumo achieved his primary objectives very successfully, but his overriding concern on the last point required him to abandon the secondary objective. From a military perspective, I find that this is an acceptable outcome for the Pearl Harbour operations (alone).

391947[/snapback]

I have to concur. Nagumo had no knowledge of where the U.S. Carriers actually were and had they actually been grouped not too far off Pearl and managed to pull off what they did at Midway (and they wouldn't have needed as much luck since the Japanese carriers probably had a limited CAP at the time and decks busy with the Pearl Harbor operations), we'd be tearing Nagumo a new one over how he pretty much handed the Pacific over to the U.S. at their first engagement. Landing such a strong blow and getting away with it scot-free is a good showing and saying that his conservative play was a mistake is like saying an American football team should've went for that fourth down conversion in the first quarter and the touchdown instead of just a field goal because in the end they lost by two. Too much hindsight.

Although, I will admit that Pearl Harbor DOES give a lot of potential 'what if' options. Given how many long and short term warning indicators the U.S. got and ignored (argue all you want about how the longers ones were deliberately ignored, but you gotta love the sheer coincidence of a friendly bomber group being expected and therefore the large formation detected inbound being assumed to be them), there's so much opportunity to speculate on what could have happened. All useless in the end, but pure fun.

As for notable sea battles, how about the Battle of Actium? All things considered, it wasn't so much a great battle (Mark Anthony's forces suffering from illness which undermanned their large, bulky ships and the lack of dedicated support from his Egyptian allies made the battle much more lopsided than it should've been), but it had a major impact on the overall war between the two triumvirs. Anthony's army was of comparable size and might to Octavian's, but after this battle, his legions were wary of who was actually in the right and many of his men deserted. Otherwise, we may have seen a long, drawn out series of land engagements between the legions of the west and the legions and local armies of the east.

[mechaninac]

My vote goes to:

Admiral William ("Bull") Frederick Halsey, Jr.

"I never trust a fighting man who doesnt smoke or drink."

Attributed to Admiral William Halsey, courtesy Lexmark Corp. Quotation Server.

Halsey, William Frederick, Jr. (1882-1959), was one of the leading United States naval commanders during World War II. General Douglas MacArthur called Halsey "the greatest fighting admiral" of World War II.

Halsey became vice-admiral in command of a Pacific carrier division in 1940. He commanded this division in attacks on the Gilbert and Marshall Islands and on Wake Island and Marcus Island in February, 1942. Later in 1942, he took command of U. S. naval forces in the South Pacific. In a series of bloody battles, his forces defeated the Japanese in the Solomon Islands. This victory enabled American land forces to occupy the entire island chain. During this period, Halsey also supported the opening offensives of General MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific. Halsey took command of the Third Fleet on June 15, 1944. In the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October, 1944, Halsey's fleet and Admiral Thomas Kincaid's Seventh Fleet smashed the Japanese Navy and virtually eliminated it from the war.

The Japanese later signed the surrender on Halsey's flagship, the battleship Missouri . Halsey was born in Elizabeth, N. J., and was graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1904. (Excerpt courtesy World Book Encyclopedia, 1986.)

[Zentrandude]

General William Mitchell for seeing aircraft would spell the end for battleships back in the 1920s

Since it was widely accepted that America's first line of defense was the Navy with its battleships, Mitchell decided to prove that he could sink one with an airplane. By 1921 Mitchell had created such uproars that the Navy agreed to allow him to perform his demonstration. Confidant that he could not succeed, the Navy provided several captured German ships to be used as targets including the battleship Ostfriesland. The most impressive part of the demonstration was the sinking of the "unsinkable" Ostfriesland.

Edited April 18, 2006 by Zentrandude

[Retracting Head Ter Ter]

I'm gonna be the devil's advocate here and say that its a possibility that things might have been better for Japan if Pearl Harbour never happened.

If the USN had tried to sail to the Phillipines, they would have come into range of land based air. Now, I am not sure if PH never happened, how wary the USN command would be of air strikes but whilst virtually all the battleships sunk at PH were refloated, you can bet any that sank on the western half of the pacific would not.

As for the 3rd strike. It wouldn't have KO'ed the US much more. The IJN bombers didn't pack enough bombs to completely destroy the heavy equipment.

[Rocket Punch]

I wonder if we'd still have PSPs and DSs if Pearl Harbor never happened?

[Phyrox]

I think it was a turning point, and many others . It conclusively ended Germany's attempt to break the continental blockade that was slowly eating away at its economy. After Jutland the Grand fleet never sortied again, and production of Battleships ended with the last Seydlitz class, as it was believed hat there were greater priorities. Moreover, it ended the threat of German Raids on the east coast of England, that did far more damage than any zepplin/bomber raid ever accomplished. Although a few more raids were carried out several weeks after, Jutland really ended the end of German traditional naval warfare. It forced Germany to resort to unconventional warfare (Uboats) and a military success on the continent.  It many ways Jutland ensured the ultimate victory of the Allies, even if it wasn't a conclusive battle operationally.

391962[/snapback]

I'm not arguing that. I agree. It was a turning point of sorts. And it WAS decisive, although it tooks quite a long time for it to be seen that way. Decisive, important, interesting: yeah. Influential: no.

My reading of the word influential in this case was that it implied a certain lasting impact (on naval or popular thinking/imagination). That I don't think is the case. If it was merely used to be interchangable with important, then I wouldn't have disagreed. Word usage in english is a subtle art, and in this case that seemed to be the meaning. I guess I must have mistook the original poster's meaning.

[Ladic]

Combat of Jambeli

Certainly not one of greats, but the most famous in Ecuadorean history

http://www.fuerzasarmadasecuador.org/engli...ctosjambeli.htm

[kalvasflam]

Response to Halsey, and Leyte.

The IJN were both lucky and unlucky in Leyte. Lucky in that their opponent was not Spruance, but that hothead Halsey, who frankly isn't a good admiral. If I had to pick between Spruance and Halsey as naval commanders, I would've picked Spruance, not as flashy, not as loud, and not as dumb. They got through Halsey's 3rd fleet and ended up in the middle of the escort carrier group off of Samar. BTW, if you read about Halsey, he is the same fool that twice got his fleet caught in hurricanes, and the world famous phrase: "where rpt where is task force 58. The world wonders" supposedly brought Halsey close to tears. That's not a mark of a good naval commander. (I will grant that Halsey did a good job in Guadalcanal and earlier on, and his best move was to let Spruance have command in Midway).

IJN was unlucky in that they were so heavily outnumbered, witness the battleship action between Olendorf and Nishimura, the latter was destroyed with exception of unlucky Shigure. The 3rd fleet crushed what was left of Japanese carrier arm, and the escort carrier group (even though some of them went down), went down swinging, and inflicted large damage against an attacking force of battleships and cruisers.

The only regret was that neither the Yamato nor the Musashi saw action against Ching Lee's fast battleships. That should've been the final fight between battleships. I have no doubt that even if it was just a battleship fight without carrier aircraft, the US fast BB would've killed the Japanese surface fleet. Alas, thanks to idiot Halsey, that was not to be.

[Noyhauser]

I think it was a turning point, and many others . It conclusively ended Germany's attempt to break the continental blockade that was slowly eating away at its economy. After Jutland the Grand fleet never sortied again, and production of Battleships ended with the last Seydlitz class, as it was believed hat there were greater priorities. Moreover, it ended the threat of German Raids on the east coast of England, that did far more damage than any zepplin/bomber raid ever accomplished. Although a few more raids were carried out several weeks after, Jutland really ended the end of German traditional naval warfare. It forced Germany to resort to unconventional warfare (Uboats) and a military success on the continent.  It many ways Jutland ensured the ultimate victory of the Allies, even if it wasn't a conclusive battle operationally.

391962[/snapback]

I'm not arguing that. I agree. It was a turning point of sorts. And it WAS decisive, although it tooks quite a long time for it to be seen that way. Decisive, important, interesting: yeah. Influential: no.

My reading of the word influential in this case was that it implied a certain lasting impact (on naval or popular thinking/imagination). That I don't think is the case. If it was merely used to be interchangable with important, then I wouldn't have disagreed. Word usage in english is a subtle art, and in this case that seemed to be the meaning. I guess I must have mistook the original poster's meaning.

392101[/snapback]

Oh I think its influential as well, using your terms. It convinced the German High Command of the futility of trying to stand up to the Allied naval blockade. It ended Wilhelm's aspirations of become a truly global superpower, and limited Germany to a purely Continental power, which ultimately set it on the path to WW2. After Jutland, Germany would never have its "Place in the Sun." Submarine warfare was completely different, it made the navy subservient to winning the continental war. The building of the Grand Fleet was construed by the British as the greatest threat to their State, and for that to be so completely abandoned and such a major shift in german strategic thought all because of a single battle, is extremely influential.

And if you want to go on a purely technical side, it convinced the British that they had to become proficient in night engements, which they weren't. The British invested alot to become alot better in this area, and by WW2 could be said to be equally good at night engagements, even at home during them.

Edited April 18, 2006 by Noyhauser

[kalvasflam]

On Pearl Harbor and the possibility of it not happening.

Pearl Harbor was a watershed, it represented the first concentrated use of fleet air arm against surface opponents. And it was a rousing success, notwithstanding Nagumo's mistakes. Up until then, the role of the carrier was not well defined as a strike arm, but more as a scouting and recon arm for the battle fleet.

Both IJN and USN preceived the fleets that way until Ozawa, Genda and a few visionaries persuaded Yamamoto, and then the world otherwise.

Had Pearl Habor not happend, the Japanese could've conceivably moved a little faster (but not much more) with the extra six carrier decks. And the US wouldn't have learned the lesson about carrier air power until later. Remember, those six decks were unavailable for about three weeks during the Pearl strike. During that time frame, the IJN still ran wild in the South Pacific. With those decks, they could've wiped out the ADBA, and the Brit fleet in India earlier.

The USN would've been put off guard, because they would've moved the few carriers and a bunch of obsolete battleships to aid the Phillipines, and those may have been all wiped out. Carriers would've acted as scouts, the only reason that carriers became prime in Pacific was that they were the only major units immediately available after Pearl.

In the final analysis, the IJN and Japan was doomed the second they launched Pearl Harbor. Had they played the negotiations game, they may have been a little further ahead, but strategically, Pearl Harbor didn't gain them anything more than a brief respite, and did more harm because it galvanized the Americans and taught them the lesson of naval air early on. Hawaii was never a part of their defense in depth concept. And it wouldn't have been possible to take Pearl and take down the oil in SE Asia. And oil was the strategic focus of the war for Japan anyway.

[Phyrox]

Oh I think its influential as well, using your terms.

Well, now you are misunderstanding me. Germany's naval impotence convinced some of its leaders that it had to be a continental power, not the battle of Jutland itself. Jutland was sympomatic of Germany's inadequate naval power and geographic position.

The influence the battle had on waking up the overly self-satisfied Royal Navy was important in some ways I suppose.

But to call Jutland influential, in the same way that Solomon Islands was, or Trafalgar, or even U-9s shocking success is, again, mistaken in my view.

Beyond the immediate strategic and tactical context, Jutland has had little impact or influence.

You bring up an interesting point however. Amoung my circle it is generally accepted that the case is closed on this issue. It was not thought that this was something about which knowledgeable people would disagree. I am still unconvinced obviously, but I'll ask some of my colleagues what they think.

[Akilae]

On Pearl Harbor:

One discussion I've heard was based on the futility of Pearl Harbor... main argument here being that on the lonng run the US with its industrial capacity simply could not be stopped. The "devastation" at Pearl Harbor also provided the USN with an excellent opportunity to update its fleet in one sweep. If the fleet as it was pre-Pearl were to face the IJN a few months later and without the galvanization of Pearl, the outcome of the war might have been different, if not prolonged.

On Jutland:

The influence of Jutland I think is very subtle and very far reaching. As Noyhauser said, the attempt of the German High Seas Fleet to break out carried the hope of the German High Command to take the war away from the continent and break the economic blockade. Jutland convinced Germany that it could not compete as a naval power against Britain. This extends into the second world war, in which the Atlantic battle seems suspiciously lacking in terms of large scale German surface action (compared to the Pacific...), save the rather exciting sinking of the Bismark.

[kalvasflam]

On Jutland:

The influence of Jutland I think is very subtle and very far reaching.  As Noyhauser said, the attempt of the German High Seas Fleet to break out carried the hope of the German High Command to take the war away from the continent and break the economic blockade.  Jutland convinced Germany that it could not compete as a naval power against Britain.  This extends into the second world war, in which the Atlantic battle seems suspiciously lacking in terms of large scale German surface action (compared to the Pacific...), save the rather exciting sinking of the Bismark.

392212[/snapback]

Well, in terms of WWI. The Germans learned an important lesson... simply put. They had to change the paradigm of naval warfare. Surface was out, and since carriers weren't likely. They went with U-boats. Admittedly, the U-boats were not as successful as they were in WWI. But it was the right idea.

[neptunesurvey]

Adm Togo's victories over the Russian Navy in 1904-1905. Especially in the Tsushima Strait.

With the German Uboats during WWII they where more successful then you might think. They did lose over 700 Uboats, mostly after 1943, but tonnage sunk was over 10 million tons. I would say the Uboots where a little more successful.

[Akilae]

Adm Togo's victories over the Russian Navy in 1904-1905.  Especially in the Tsushima Strait.

With the German Uboats during WWII they where more successful then you might think.  They did lose over 700 Uboats, mostly after 1943, but tonnage sunk was over 10 million tons.  I would say the Uboots where a little more successful.

392222[/snapback]

Remember, Donitz accomplished all this with a little more than 20 boats at sea at any given time, quite an accomplishment for such a small fleet.

[kalvasflam]

Adm Togo's victories over the Russian Navy in 1904-1905.  Especially in the Tsushima Strait.

With the German Uboats during WWII they where more successful then you might think.  They did lose over 700 Uboats, mostly after 1943, but tonnage sunk was over 10 million tons.  I would say the Uboots where a little more successful.

392222[/snapback]

Success is based on how close they actually came to victory. Comparatively, the U-boats did much better in WWI in terms of how close they strangled the Brits. There is no doubt they succeeded in hurting the Brits, but they didn't come nearly as close as they did in WWI in putting down the Brits.

[Duke Togo]

Wood vs Carpet, one of the greatest engagements of all time!

[Noyhauser]

Funny I thought Duke Togo vs articulate constructive posting was a pretty interesting engagement, one that saw Duke Togo flee from the field of battle and take residence in a neutral third party forum. I wonder if he'll eventually tick them off too, and then be forced to scuttle himself rather than return here.

Phyrox would that be considered influential or decisive?

Duke, go find something else to do, rather than ruin what was a pretty interesting discussion. You're coming up pretty lame, as usual.

[Lynx7725]

Duke, go find something else to do, rather than ruin what was a pretty interesting discussion. You're coming up pretty lame, as usual.

392297[/snapback]

Quoted for Truth.

Back to topic. Is Pearl Harbour a necessary precursor to the Japanese occupation of SE Asia and Southern Pacific? Personally, I believe it is necessary. Removing the US surface fleet from the equation allowed the IJN to run amok within the area without any real threat against it. If the US surface fleet had been around to contest any Japanese operations, losses would inevitably occur and it would eventually reduce the power and hence expansion rate of the empire. That's if things go right for the Japanese in a fleet action. If things go wrong... then the Japanese ambitions would die in the cradle.

Remember, there was no guarantee that the IJN training is so superior that any surface engagement would automatically go the way of the Japanese. USN concentrated heavily on daylight gunnery; had they been able to force an engagement in broad daylight, it's a good chance that the USN would sail away victorious, even with the pre-war naval asset. It has to be remembered that pre-war naval treaty had restricted the ratio of warships between the US and Japan (and other countries) prior to Japan ignoring the treaty. In other words, till Pearl Harbour, the USN might actually had a numerical advantage in hulls over IJN.

No, eliminating the US fleet is an absolute necessity prior to Japanese advances in other areas. Yes, the industrial might of the US would make good such losses relatively quickly -- but the time that this replacement would need would give the Japanese some breathing space. Perhaps sufficiently to fortify its position and turn a de facto situation to a de jure situation.

Yamamoto knew he couldn't win a protracted war with the US; he had been to the US and had seen the industrial capabilities. IIRC, he advised against going to war with the US, and was famously quoted as being confident of only running wild for the first 6 months of the war.

So, an idealized version of Japanese War Strategy might have gone something like this:

• Eliminate US Pacific Fleet
  
• Advance and fortify all the land that can be grabbed
  
• Continue production and training of IJN
  
• Force engagement with the re-arming USN on terms that are beneficial to the IJN (i.e. night combat with torpedoes). Keep the attrition rates favourable to IJN
  
• Avoid other engagements as far as possible.
  
• Continue until the US sensitivity to casaulties kicks in.
  

Remember, most of USN's (and conversely IJN's) support facilities are waaaay outside the engagement range of the opponent's vehicles; it was not until quite late in the war that the US could seriously bomb Japan's shipyards, and the only worthwhile US naval facilities that the IJN could get at was Hawaii, which would be quickly reestablished since Japan would seriously overreach itself trying to occupy Hawaii.

Hence, the concept of Total War cannot be seriously implemented until one side has an overwhelming advantage, since the real support structure cannot be directly attacked. It was not until Japanese suffered many military setbacks that the US could bring military force to bear on civilian targets, thus increasing the downward slide. Had some key battles gone the other way, the USN and the IJN would be locked in an attritional war, and it's really unclear which side would have the advantage -- the USN with its greater industrial might but longer (and more vulnerable) supply lines, or the IJN with their lesser industrial might but shorter supply lines.

In the greater context, IJN might have been banking on Nazi Germany to divert part of the US' industrial might. Had Operation Barbarossa, the North African and Italian campaigns, or Operation Overlord gone slightly south for the Allies, the US might not have been bogged down in Europe, and the casualty sensitivity might have kicked in even earlier.

[kalvasflam]

Back to topic. Is Pearl Harbour a necessary precursor to the Japanese occupation of SE Asia and Southern Pacific? Personally, I believe it is necessary. Removing the US surface fleet from the equation allowed the IJN to run amok within the area without any real threat against it. If the US surface fleet had been around to contest any Japanese operations, losses would inevitably occur and it would eventually reduce the power and hence expansion rate of the empire. That's if things go right for the Japanese in a fleet action. If things go wrong... then the Japanese ambitions would die in the cradle.

Remember, there was no guarantee that the IJN training is so superior that any surface engagement would automatically go the way of the Japanese. USN concentrated heavily on daylight gunnery; had they been able to force an engagement in broad daylight, it's a good chance that the USN would sail away victorious, even with the pre-war naval asset. It has to be remembered that pre-war naval treaty had restricted the ratio of warships between the US and Japan (and other countries) prior to Japan ignoring the treaty. In other words, till Pearl Harbour, the USN might actually had a numerical advantage in hulls over IJN.

No, eliminating the US fleet is an absolute necessity prior to Japanese advances in other areas. Yes, the industrial might of the US would make good such losses relatively quickly -- but the time that this replacement would need would give the Japanese some breathing space. Perhaps sufficiently to fortify its position and turn a de facto situation to a de jure situation.

Yamamoto knew he couldn't win a protracted war with the US; he had been to the US and had seen the industrial capabilities. IIRC, he advised against going to war with the US, and was famously quoted as being confident of only running wild for the first 6 months of the war.

So, an idealized version of Japanese War Strategy might have gone something like this:

• Eliminate US Pacific Fleet
  
• Advance and fortify all the land that can be grabbed
  
• Continue production and training of IJN
  
• Force engagement with the re-arming USN on terms that are beneficial to the IJN (i.e. night combat with torpedoes). Keep the attrition rates favourable to IJN
  
• Avoid other engagements as far as possible.
  
• Continue until the US sensitivity to casaulties kicks in.
  

Remember, most of USN's (and conversely IJN's) support facilities are waaaay outside the engagement range of the opponent's vehicles; it was not until quite late in the war that the US could seriously bomb Japan's shipyards, and the only worthwhile US naval facilities that the IJN could get at was Hawaii, which would be quickly reestablished since Japan would seriously overreach itself trying to occupy Hawaii.

Hence, the concept of Total War cannot be seriously implemented until one side has an overwhelming advantage, since the real support structure cannot be directly attacked. It was not until Japanese suffered many military setbacks that the US could bring military force to bear on civilian targets, thus increasing the downward slide. Had some key battles gone the other way, the USN and the IJN would be locked in an attritional war, and it's really unclear which side would have the advantage -- the USN with its greater industrial might but longer (and more vulnerable) supply lines, or the IJN with their lesser industrial might but shorter supply lines.

In the greater context, IJN might have been banking on Nazi Germany to divert part of the US' industrial might. Had Operation Barbarossa, the North African and Italian campaigns, or Operation Overlord gone slightly south for the Allies, the US might not have been bogged down in Europe, and the casualty sensitivity might have kicked in even earlier.

392302[/snapback]

Some very good reasoning. I think though that the Japanese may have better been able to consolidate their gains in the key battle area (South Pacific) where things truly mattered. The fleet that would have come out from Pearl if the US hadn't been hit would still not have matched the Japanese forces qualitatively in early 1942. Witness Guadalcanal for example, where the IJN dominated earlier on, and lost really thru attrition.

To me, Japan fought the equivalent of a two front war with just one force. They needed to fend off MacArthur's counterattack from Australia, and stop Nimitz's navy from pounding across the central Pacific. I think it would've been better if the Japanese had entirely eliminated the MacArthur threat by taking Australia or cutting the communications lane to Australia. There the carrier formation in the early days could've made a big difference, possibly even in taking out MacArthur himself and eliminating the southern US sub force that caused so much grief later on. The only area that they lacked if they were to take on Australia was the amphibious elements. They certainly had troops enough in China to do this. The fact that they didn't I think was a big mistake.

In failing to conquer the southern front, the Japanese effectively brought about Guadalcanal and the destruction of the IJN surface forces.

As far as the US plans, I believe it called for reinforcement of the Phillipines with the Pac fleet in Pearl. That would've been a disaster I think, because IJN strategy there involved whittling down US forces as they crossed the Pacific with night time torpedo attacks, air bombardment, and ultimately a decisive engagement with battle wagons. In the first two areas, the Japanese dominated in 1941 and early 1942. How that would've played out in reality though is just something we all have to speculate on.

In regards to Germany, the allies always considered Japan to be a secondary issue to be resolved after Germany was history. But in the European theater, the navy was not quite as important. The ships needed in the Atlantic were destroyers, and escort carriers, not full blown battleships and fleet carriers. In the end though, it didn't really matter since the US economy produced enough for both theaters.

[Warmaker]

From my knowledge of military history, Naval warfare is one of my weakest.

But from what I know of, I will put in Adm. Nimitz of the U.S.Navy from WWII.

Basically placed in charge of the US Pacific Fleet after the disaster at Pearl Harbor. He led the USN all the way until Japan's surrender.

Good enough that the USN named their greatest Aircraft Carrier class after him, the Nimitz Class CVN's.