Noyhauser

Thanks David, a friend of mine who works in defence aerospace was curious. He's curious about whether it will be the success that many are imagining. During a recent party two friends of mine who work in the airline industry (in a big way) made the comment the A380 wasn't nearly as profitable as had been hoped for... have you seen any figures to corroborate that? It does... so much so that I'll pick up the Fujimi 1/72 version of it.

David or someone else... Can someone explain how the 787 is insulated from lightning strikes? I've heard about some use of metal inlays in the skin but nothing conclusive has come up.

Having a year or two year refit is one thing... the personnel problems aren't serious because you can keep a core group of individuals to bring to the new carrier and train them with your allies. Ten years is very different because almost none of the personnel will remain around. They are either promoted or in all likelihood out of the service all together (Because of budget cutbacks.)You're basically starting from scratch with everything; aircraft maintainers, deck crews, air control and the pilots themselves. Maybe upgrading from ski to catapult isn't that big an issue because its practically no different from starting with nothing for the Royal Navy. Its also an issue because there will be a major cutback in the number of aircraft the UK will fly. All harriers will all be cut and there will be fewer Tornados available. So where will the FAA pilots get their flight time? I've dealt with regenerating a capability after a significant break on the army side and it was difficult there. Even within two years we saw a significant degradation of skills due to lack of training: beyond that it gets very sketchy. Considering the complexity of a modern carrier and its operations, that problem will be multiplied many times over. These issues aren't very apparent for a large military like the United States that can afford everything, but when you look at Canada, the UK, Australia, cutting capabilities is a dangerous proposition. Once you cut it, then its actually quite difficult to regenerate it because you're starting from scratch. For example one of the reasons why Canada purchased second hand British submarines was that they didn't want to lose the ability to operate submarines. Submarines weren't that required, but the Department was taking a long view and predicting they may need such a capability in two to three decades time. Definitely its an issue... then again the Marines seem very good at getting their pieces of kit through no matter how small the order... MV-22 anyone? It looks like they are going with a single model... the F-35Cs. This isn't too surprising; the RAF and FAA have been sharing Harriers in a joint force arrangement over Afghanistan. Sharing one fighter now seems to be an extension of that. I suspect they've done the preliminary negotiations with LM and there shouldn't be much of an issue. Not according to this budget. The UK just slashed 128 Billion pounds from its budget... some departments lost 25% of their funding and 400' date='000 public sector jobs got slashed. I don't think they are going to be looking at any fighters for the next decade. I really doubt that would happen with Canada, maybe Australia. The F-35A is barely going to pass through as is, I doubt there is an appetite to add a carrier air wing to that. There might be some possibility for the Aussies with their amphib capabilities... but that would put significant strain on the Carrier's availability for operations in Europe where the brits have obligations as part of NATO and the ESDP.

Lynx: The QEs are intended to be large carriers, probably equal in size and capability to the old Essex refits compared to the Nimitz class.They just aren't going to carry much in the way of fighters because the UK doesn't have the money to fully equip them. Their total load is 50 planes, though I think its a bit conservative given the sheer size of the vessel. Hey, I don't disagree with you, except I think the problem is not a military/strategic one. Its not like the UK has a dire need for its carrier capabilities between now and 2020. The whole perspective behind this Strategic Defence Review is Austerity; UK is going to be broke for the next ten years anyway and won;t be doing much of anything at all. It would be a pretty dire crisis for it mount any type of operation... and the illustrious offers a pretty minimal capability with its aging hull. The SDR spares the Royal navy's expeditionary capability, with the retention of the HMS Ocean, while the EU battlegroups concept provides some ability to access French capabilities if the need arises. My concerns stems from a training and force generation standpoint (and maybe yours does too?). Not is there a ten year gap in capabilities, but the FAA is adopting an entirely new technology they haven't used since the early 1970s. The pilots they will use for the QE class will all be fresh, unless they receive some sort of training from their coalition partners, which is tough to pull off. Even more difficult is how to establish flight operations with a deck crew, with no prior knowledge of these systems. The people who will carry this out haven't even left grade school yet... its likely not to go well at the start.

Thats actually not the shocking announcement. The big one is that they are ditching the STOVL design and building them both as Conventional carriers... and buying F-35Cs instead.This is from the original SDR. •We will need to operate only one aircraft carrier. We cannot now foresee circumstances in which the UK would require the scale of strike capability previously planned. We are unlikely to face adversaries in large-scale air combat. We are far more likely to engage in precision operations, which may need to overcome sophisticated air defence capabilities. The single carrier will therefore routinely have 12 fast jets embarked for operations while retaining the capacity to deploy up to the 36 previously planned, providing combat and intelligence capability much greater than the existing Harriers. It will be able to carry a wide range of helicopters, including up to 12 Chinook or Merlin transports and eight Apache attack helicopters. The precise mix of aircraft will depend on the mission, allowing the carrier to support a broad range of operations including landing a Royal Marines Commando Group, or a Special Forces Squadron conducting a counter- terrorism strike, assisting with humanitarian crises or the evacuation of UK nationals. • A single carrier needs to be fully effective. As currently designed, the Queen Elizabeth will not be fully interoperable with key allies, since their naval jets could not land on it. Pursuit of closer partnership is a core strategic principle for the Strategic Defence and Security Review because it is clear that the UK will in most circumstances act militarily as part of a wider coalition. We will therefore install catapult and arrestor gear. This will delay the in-service date of the new carrier from 2016 to around 2020. But it will allow greater interoperability with US and French carriers and naval jets. It provides the basis for developing joint Maritime Task Groups in the future. This should both ensure continuous carrier-strike availability, and reduce the overall carrier protection requirements on the rest of the fleet, releasing ships for other naval tasks such as protection of key sea-lanes, or conducting counter- piracy and narcotics operations. • The strike needs to be made more capable. Installing the catapult and arrestor will allow the UK to acquire the carrier-variant of Joint Strike Fighter ready to deploy on the converted carrier instead of the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant. This version of the jet has a longer range and greater payload: this, not large numbers of aircraft, is the critical requirement for precision strike operations in the future. The UK plans to operate a single model of JSF, instead of different land and naval variants. Overall, the carrier-variant of the JSF will be cheaper, reducing through-life costs by around 25%. That's all and good but how are you going to train naval aviators for your new ship? And has anybody explained to them that the French and americans use different catapult systems or there is a difference between the 35A and 35C?

I'd disagree with some of you said. I think the problem here is with some people saying "I don't like Plus, Seven, zero or Frontier because its not macross" as if SDF was some pure, unimpeachable near religious text that everything must be defined by. To me saying that doesn't not make you a macross fan... it makes one somewhat of a "closed minded macross fan." I think all those series tie into aspects of macross and introduce their own... which add so much more to the entire series. And what is "the original macross? Is it SDF or DYRL? There are differences between each that makes it less clear what is "macross." For example, When people say that Macross is gritty war drama and unlike its sequels... its kinda like huh? First off, macross wasn't as gritty as some of its contemporaries; Space Runaway Ideon and Gundam were far grittier in many respects, as was Armored Troopers Votoms. Sure you can say that kids were piloting the Gundam and the like, but more of their main characters perished than in Macross. And they didn't win against Zeon by singing their way out... thats for sure. Moreover I think Plus and Frontier are grittier in some respects (though I'd probably say that Frontier was at the same level as SDF Macross.) I know these are subjective judgements, but they are there to illustrate my point. I think to simply say that "macross is this way and the rest aren't like it," to me seems ignorant of what macross was like compared to the culture of its day as well as how successive releases compare to it and their contemporaries.

I agree that the writing was poor overall for Macross Zero, but I think the flying rocks weren't one of the problems. People expect that super-advanced beings must have dispensed with myths and superstitions in order to achieve greatness. Having recently re-watched Frontier and Zero, its really apparent how spiritual the Protoculture really were. They worshiped the mysteries of the universe like the Vajira and had elaborate rituals and iconography to support it. Floating rocks, bird-men and other pieces of technology reflected that. There was an obvious contradiction which I think Kawamori was trying to show. The islanders way of life, despite being extremely primitive compared to the UN was more in line with how the Protoculture thought. Thats why they had a connection to the island, which responded to their emotions. What was "magical" were effects created by Protoculture machines, whether it be the Bird Human or some other automated system at work.

Well I've been busy with a couple of projects... I've got a VT-1 almost done and these two. The F/A-18E is a repaint of a model I built as a UN-Spacy Theme. I thought it would be nice to have it in a real scheme. The other is a 1/72 FH-1 Phantom, the Navy's first jet aircraft. You can see theextended build here.

What about Takeshi Miyazawa?

There are several assertions which need clarification. For most of the war Germany never really had design superiority. Prior to 1942 with the introduction of the Pzkf IV Ausf F, the German Tanks were inferior in quality and numbers to their opposites in French British and Soviet service. German tanks were always hard to maintain; prior to 1942 their best tanks were Czech designs, the 35 and the 38. Tigers only arrived in early 1943 as a response to German tank squadrons getting mauled by their russian counterparts. Germans may have had a technical edge in 1943, but by 44 the Russians introduced the IS-2 and up-gunned T34s which wrestled back superiority. Its important to note that right up to the end of the war, the main german tank being produced was the Panzer IV, not the Tiger or Panther. Throughout the war if there was one constant it was the the exceptional quality of German tactical and operational leadership. Platoon to division sized units were very good at carrying out operations, often under their own initiative. While not every german tank was a Tiger, it certainly felt that way to many allied tankers because of how effectively armor and infantry was employed. The problem was that by 1943 the Allies had developed strategies at the operational level to frustrate German envelopments, and had enough units so that they could overcome any qualitative advantage that the germans had on the ground. The Russians became adept at implementing deep envelopment maneuvers. If you look at Operation Bagration in June of 1944, Soviet forces basically carried out an operation comparable in size and scope to Barbarossa, against an opponent that knew full well an offensive was coming. The technical quality of the USAF is unparalleled and yes there is a risk of technological hubris. However I think the US is very good at looking around the world at new developments and judging the threat they posed. This started after Vietnam, where the USAF and USN encountered severe difficulty against a relatively low-tech enemy.

Yeah, just because they have it as a weapon, doesn't mean they intended to be one or will use it as such. The overall point I'm trying to make here (and have several times) is that any war will cause untold damage and is unlikely to ever happen. Yeah but serviceability cuts both ways and actually works to the US's favor. Its nice to believe that some upstart nation would buy 150 T-50s and instantly become an equal threat to the US's 150+ F-22s. In reality they won't all be serviceable at any one time and their pilots abilities will fare very poorly. US aircraft are all very well maintained and their pilots get almost double the flying hours than the Russians or anybody else.

Uhh, nice tangent but its off the mark. I never said that China was aiming to using T-bills as a weapon. Its a deterrent for both sides as they are heavily invested into a global trade architecture. My general point is that war is unlikely in any realistic scenario, and the costs of that war would be far more grievous than losing a couple of high end fighters. I really don't think the Chinese are actually doing alot to undermine US hegemony; in reality its just exerting its influence into areas the United States has left open for the better part of 15 years. If anything, the growing links with Vietnam and India constitute the United States exerting greater influence into this area than China.

We use F/A-18E/Fs, F-16s and F-15Es over afghanistan on a daily basis where they provide critical FAC support.. The maintenance costs of these aircraft are significant and their shortcomings evident. The F-35 is more fuel efficient and as a newer airframe, has lower maintenance costs save for maybe the Super Hornet. The problem is that there isn't a single potential adversary in the next 15 years that could overwhelm 180 F-22s. Only China could and they have far more effective weapons that can wreak far more damage on the United States than a couple of 5th gen fighters (They are called T-Bills.)

Well here is my question then... what possible scenario do you foresee that the USAF needs more than 180 of these fighters? I assume you're in the Marines by your tag; will you ever see an F-22 in an bonafide operational environment in the next 10 years? They are actually too expensive and fragile to operate in places like afghanistan and because of their archaic architecture and sensitive coatings. If given the option between 300 MRAPs or one F-22 which would you chose? Or better yet, 2.5 F-35s? In many ways the F-35 is more valuable for the USAF, given that it will actually operate regularly over places like Afghanistan at a lower cost than F-22s.

Eh I'm not feeling any of these criticisms or the ones posted on here. I play with three of my friends and I'd consider us pretty good gamers: I've got 18000 kills on MW2 and a brigadier account on Halo 3. I'd say that Reach takes less skill than MW2, but thats generally been true for the series and it isn't that big a gap. If you have skill you'll basically win more times than you lose. Headshots don't matter until you take down shields. Once they are down headshots are one hit kills, usually. I have felt "robbed" that I hit a guy in the head but he didn't go down... but its no more of an issue than what I've experienced in MW2. If anything Grenades (and the noobtube in particular) are far more lethal in MW2 than in Halo reach. It was a serious problem that most gamers that I know turned them off of the game (that and the Spas). I'm almost certain that grenades lethal radius is smaller in Halo. Moreover the prevalence of the DMR and the needle rifle makes grenades less effective because you'll rarely close into throwing range. Vehicle availability isn't a problem. You see them alot in Hemorrhage, the shipbreakers level, paradiso, among others. Its really no different in rotation than what you saw in Halo3 slayer. Actually if there is a problem is that on Hemorrhage and other maps vehicles are far too powerful and their counter weapons are too rare. On Hemorrhage you'll often see a tank gunner rack up 25+ kills on BTG without breaking a sweat, sitting in the back third of their base.

Oh I knew you were agreeing with me Nied, if anything I was trying to add nuance to my view. I think you and I know this program had some serious issues; maybe my emphasis is different from yours. Maybe it was too direct because I didn't mean to say that you were wrong. To be perfectly honest this situation was predicted to occur back in the 1970s... see Augustine's Law. In reality its prohibitive cost and a much reduced threat environment determined the program's cancellation. And this isn't really a failure; the USAF has in its possession a top tier fighter in numbers that should be commensurate to the threat it face. Its probably good to remind people what is a failure; The Westinghouse J-40 is an good example. Not only did the engine flop, but it basically killed two very important fighter designs for the Navy; the F3H Demon and the F7U Cutlass. The F-15's longevity is due to a lot of factors. It provides a reasonable capability for second tier allies at an affordable cost. Its also enjoyed constant updating. MD/Boeing has smartly continued upgrading the design and it remains quite modern. They moved to an relatively open architecture back around 2000, which has kept avionics costs down.

Because thats what E2046 does: recasting.

Uh, so you're suggesting that someone recast a model that just was produced?

I think its a slightly greater issue than that. The RAND study listed resourcing as a production problem; according to its survey 20% of vendors would likely have an issue with restarting production after a two year hiatus and 44% might have an issue (20~49% chance of them having an issue.) Its not insurmountable, but the fact that most of the F-22's parts (particularly the avionics which accounts for 50% of its cost) were custom built with now obsolete technology, does make re-sourcing a significant issue. Moreover, tooling is important, but the point I was getting at with my reply to yours was the issue surrounding the loss of human technical ability at the major contractor level (like LM Fort Worth or Boeing Seattle) and below. Capabilities aren't just the physical (machine) capability to produce something but must include the humans who operate that machinery. Because of the poorly thought out production decisions, Boeing isn't going to maintain a whole cadre of employees in Seattle waiting to produce F-22 sub-assemblies when that facility isn't going to be used for anything else. Instead, these employees will be moved to other projects and will be unavailable for re-hiring. The RAND survey predicted only 13% of the workforce would remain under a stop-restart scenario; it could be as low as 1%. Thus to restart production LM and Boeing will need to train new individuals, who are completely inexperienced and less efficient at producing something compared to a pre-closedown worker. If it was produced at a dedicated facility: El Segundo or St Louis, then more of these individuals maybe rehired to restart production (at less of a cost.) These two issues combined will dramatically increase the unit-cost. With a managed shutdown and restart the cost of 75 new fighters will increase the fly-away cost of the F-22 by 30%: from 139 million to 179 million each. At $179 million, the USAF could buy two, if not three F-35s, (depending on the final production costs of the JSF.) Thats the economic and strategic trade off faced by the SECDEF, which is probably why he came down so decisively on the closure of the F-22 line. My guess is that most of the tools will be destroyed but some for some high-use parts will be saved. That way they can maintain the present fleet at an reasonable cost.

I think experten is going for a model that fits with the old Studio-Halfeye 1/100 line. The scale is the same, so is the model's engineering (mostly model but with screws n'stuff to make it it variable.) Cool stuff, but not my cup of tea.

Well, not exactly. I might have been overstating it if it was any other program than the F-22, but that program made some really bad management decisions that was the cause of its continuing troubles. Basically the fighter's contracting method operated much like a work-sharing program between LM, Boeing and General Dynamics (which later became LM-Fort Worth). Really LM handed out subcontracts to various major fighter manufacturers not on the basis of their expertise but on their position as major defense manufacturers. What the F-22 did was created a unnatural and very specialized manufacturing structure for the fighter. For example, Boeing makes the wings and aft fuselage of the F-22 in Seattle, where its never really produced such products. Boeing itself produces the wings of the Super Hornet in the old McDonnell Douglas facilities in St Louis and NG manufacturers the aft fuselage in El Segundo. The latter two places are where there is proven expertise, and they would likely remain for some time. With the F-22 program killed, the glue that binds that program's unwieldily manufacturing structure is gone and those parts are less likely to survive for very long. Will Boeing retain a production facility for F-22 wings in Seattle when its not being used for any other program? Maybe, but many other companies won't. Moreover replacing subcontractors will be difficult because of how tightly the F-22's manufacturing information was controlled compared to other fighters. On other fighters like the F/A-18E/F what you note is true. Many of them will keep their manufacturing structure in place for longer because they are already market leaders. For example NG El Segundo facility are contracted to produce the center and rear fuselages for F-35s in addition to the F/A-18E. The F-35 is much better in this regards than other models; its got a very open and flexible subcontractor system to ensure that you can have multiple producers. BAE systems produces the wings and empennages for the JSF; it also does so for the Eurofighter. In reality the F-22 wasn't a well managed program and this will adversely affect how long it remains viable to resurrect. Given the problems with it, I suspect that the Air Force would rather see another fighter using better management methods produced in the future.

I think its much more likely that they would like to invest in the next-gen fighter fighter program instead, with an IOC around 2025 or so. There just isn't the money for anything but the F-35 and UCAVs in the budget. Moreover the nature of defence production has changed in the past two decades so that once you cancel a program, its much harder to restart it. Saving the "jigs" doesn't really matter because you have a massive supply chain of subcontractors who custom produce parts for a fighter. Given they are limited in their scope and are one or two points removed from the government, the sub-contractors will often just close down a part line after production is over. It doesn't happen for a lot of parts, but you only need a few parts missing to massively increase the cost of restarting production.

I wouldn't call it sloppy... when the strike stuff does add weight to the arms and thats a bit of an issue. The mounting stubs are a bit weak and I broke one easily. The reality is that Hasegawa kits aren't really designed in the same way as the Bandai ones; they aren't really meant to be handled and are more display pieces.

I know. the indicates I was kidding.

If the US experienced a "lost decade" like Japan, then we could expect two fighters to be in service, not just one (Japan has seen a massive rearmament program in the past decade.)